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The spectacle of Japan marching side by sidewith European
powers and with the United States, to rescue their ministers
and its own from Chinese violation of the sacred rights of
embassy, is one of the most striking of which it is possible to
conceive. Half a century ago these two powers, China and
Japan, entered modern political society on the same footing.
So too, though in a more formal way, by the action of the
states at the Congress of Paris in 1856, Turkey was received
into the family of nations.
But no one of these three states was admitted to political
fellowship on even terms with the other powers. Their sover-
eignty was recognized by the fact that treaties were made with
them, but their inferior status was emphasized nevertheless by
the conditions of those treaties.
Turkey has remained a ward of the powers ever since, play-
ing them off skillfully against one another, yielding to pressure
when they could unite, indulging now and then in adventures
of her own, but gradually losing influence and territory.
The two others were less subject to European policies and
jealousies. For a time they trod the same path. Inboththere was
popular resistance to the new ideas, while those in authority
investigated foreign methods with varying favor. Thus there
was anti-foreign rioting in Japan, and the killing of an Ameri-
can Secretary of Legation, and the destruction of legation
premises, acts which recall the events of the past summer in
Pekin. That was in 1861 and the two years succeeding. Today
this same Japan stands for modem civilization while China
stands for resistance to it.
To understand and explain this startling difference between
the two peoples, one must study the temperament and mental
characteristics of the two and their historical development.
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This is not easy for the foreigner to do: it is not the object of
the present sketch. These few pages merely attempt to place
side by side the diplomatic relations of these two peoples with
our own country, particularly as they have found expression
in treaty form, with the hope that thus can be more easily
traced those diverging paths which have led to ideas so widely
removed.
In examining our relations with China which were estab-
lished by the treaties of 1844 and 1858, we note that two
striking features differentiate them from our ordinary commer-
cial arrangements.
First, a fixed tariff was made part of the treaty, to be
altered only with the consent of the United States. This means
that China surrendered that portion of internal sovereignty
which relates to the raising of revenue by a tax on imports and
exports at pleasure. It is as if, before putting the Dingley tariff
into effect, the United States had been compelled to secure the
assent of foreign powers to it, and with every prospect of their
refusal.
Second, American citizens, wherever admitted into China,
and American ships in the treaty-opened ports, were declared
exempt from local jurisdiction. A parallel case would be the
trial of a German subject committing crime in New Haven by
his own consul administering his native law; or the exemption
from local law of the North German Lloyd Company in New
York harbor.
As a sort of counterpart to these most serious limitations
upon Chinese sovereignty, only certain ports were opened to
the United States, and the right of embassy at the capital was
confined to special business visits, residencenotbeingpermitted.
A concession in the later treaty permitted foreigners to teach,
and natives to profess, Christianity.
The earlytreaties with Japan, of 1854,1857 and 1858, were
marked by just the same characteristics. There were two ports
opened to American trade, with others gradually added. There
was a tariff which Japan could not alter without consent. And
there was the ex-territorial privilege which handed over to United
States officials for trial all of their countrymen who were
charged with unlawful conduct. The Japanese treaty of 1858
also established religious liberty.
The relations of the two countries to modern civilization
were thus very similar, for the United States treaties were a
sample of others.
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That this contract should breed hostility to the new ideas
and their representatives was inevitable. Willingness to change
is a mark of the hopefulness of youth; conservatism is the sure
result of age; and both these nations had a past history of
great antiquity, full of honorable achievement.
Before this in China there had been trouble. The "Opium
War," exhibiting British valor to better advantage than British
justice, had resulted in large indemnities. The Taiping rebel-
lion, though not chargeable to the new influences, had been
originated by a man under missionary instruction who re-
nounced Confucianism. Before its close the accumulation of
damages to property, insults, murders of missionaries, and
treaty infractions, led to the abortive Tien-Tsin treaty, and sub-
sequently the capture of theTaku forts by France and England.
Claims of the United States against China of that period were
settled by the payment of a large indemnity, a good share of
which was afterwards returned.
The early relations between Japan and the European pow-
ers were not marked by the same violence. Nevertheless, there
was strenuous opposition to the tendency of the government
to open itself to foreign influence. There were rage and riots
aimed at foreign residents. The attack on the legations in
Tokio has been already alluded to. And in 1863, in the dis-
turbed condition attending the overthrow of the Shogunate,
the closing of the Straits of Shimonoseki to foreign trade led to
armed intervention by Great Britain, France, the United States
and The Netherlands, followed by the inevitable indemnity.
Here again the United States, to its credit, made return of its
share of the money.
There now came a period in the history of boththese states,
broadly speaking 1860-1880, when foreign influence became
more active and the native mind was forced to decide what his
country's attitude in view of it should be. Here we see a rad-
ical divergence between the policies of the two. In Japan the
governing class, some of whose representatives had before this
made themselves familiar, by travel, with European and Amer-
ican institutions, grasped the fundamental idea that in the new
civilization lay the secret of power, military, naval and political.
Their young men began to resort to foreign schools, to study
military organization and the art of war, naval construction,
modern industries and foreign systems of law. Foreign instruct-
ors were imported at the same time, so that education, the
army, the navy, the system of law, and the development of in-
dustries, were gradually revolutionized.
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China meanwhile was moving in the same direction, though
far more slowly. The power of the viceroys in the provinces
detracted from the influence and centralization of the imperial
government at Pekin, and the country was less open, geograph-
ically speaking, to contact with the new ideas. Moreover,
there seems to be an invincible conservatism in the Chinese
character which has prevented such developmentin the methods
of transportation as would tie the provinces more closely to-
gether. We see, however, a considerable extension of trade, a
desire for better relations with foreign powers as shown by the
Buckingham embassy, and lastly in certain limited regions a
large emigration of the laboring class to the islands of the
Pacific and to our own continent, north and south. But there
was no such eager plunge into new ways on the part of th6 in-
fluential as in the island kingdom.
Thus Japan was invaded by the new civilization, while
China invaded it.
The next set of treaties between the United States and these
two countries begins to mark this difference.
In the treaty of 1868 with China, trade, consular represent-
ation, religious freedom, and emigration were reciprocally ar-
ranged for, whereas before the provisions respecting these mat-
ters were unilateral, marked by exclusiveness on the part of
China, distrust on our own part.
The treaty of 1866 with Japan readjusted the tariff, en-
larged trade facilities, and promised lights, buoys, and beacons
for safer navigation.
Another decade passed and the differencein the development
of the two became more marked.
In Japan feudalism was abolished in 1871. Through local
assemblies the people were trained in representative govern-
ment, and in 1881 a royal decree announced a parliament to
begin legislative work some years later. This was established
in 1890. It has not always worked smoothly. Occasional
anti-foreign movements have sprung up. But the empire has
held to the line of development begun upon, has grown strong,
has fulfilled its international obligations, and has stood ready
to exact the performance of their engagements by other
powers.
The ruling class in China was not of the same calibre.
With less sense of honor andspirit of self-sacrifice and loyhlty,
it has neither been able in all cases to perform its international
duties nor to insist upon its rights. This is well illustrated by
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the history of the emigration question in the United States,
which was the subject of the next treaty which we notice,
in 1880.
The influx of these patient but astute work-people had be-
gun to alarm those with whom they came in competition, and
in 1880 restriction upon immigration was allowed, although
its prohibition was expressly forbidden.
The Convention of 1878 with Japan, on the contrary, en-
larged the freedom of trade, abolished export duties, increased
the number of free ports, and conceded the right of the Japan-
ese government to regulate its own tariff and commerce. Yet
still, under the most favored nation proviso, our goods paid
only the low duty which was applicable to other powers.
By this time Japan, conscious of its growing strength and
improved position amongst nations, and chafing under its in-
ternational servitudes, ex-territoriality, and a tariff not under
its control, was struggling for emancipation from them.
The former was based upon the theory that native law and
its administration failed to guaranty just treatment to foreign-
ers and their property. To disprove this the Japanese called
attention to their recent code of laws framed after European
models, and to a trained judiciary. But the latter, a compul-
sory low tariff on imports, was too beneficial to foreign trade
to be lightly surrendered, so that Japan was forced to wait
until events established her right to an untrammeled interna-
tional position.
Between 1880 and the next treaty with China in 1894, sev-
eral Acts of Congress were passed which greatly limited Chinese
immigration and regulated in the most drastic way the rights
of the Chinese already here. Some of this was in violation of
treaty until the Convention of 1894 sanctioned it. Neverthe-
less, in 1897 missionary privileges in China were enlarged, and
in 1898 Chinese immigration into Hawaii was forbidden.
This want of reciprocity sufficiently marks the inequality
of status of the two contracting parties, while the rise of Japan
to equality with ourselves is shown by the Extradition Treaty
of 1886, which follows our usual form.
Recall now the events of the last few years.
When the war with China broke out, Japan realized that
she was, so to speak, on trial. She took pains to ensure con-
formity with the rules of modern warfare in her handling of
neutral interests as well as in the operations against China.
She took so unusual a step, for instance, as the detailing of a
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professor of international law to accompany and advise the
flag officer of her fleet. In one battle only, the capture of Port
Arthur, under special provocation, was she charged with viola-
tion of the best usages. On the other hand, the Chinese were
ridiculously weak on law, and constantly violated the rules of
civilized warfare.
The speedy collapse of Chinasurprised and alarmed Europe,
and three powers curbed the Japanese when they tried to reap
the full fruits of their victory. But the indirect results of the
war were great and gratifying, for Japan was able to so revise
her treaties as to get rid of the tariff and ex-territorial restric-
tions under which she had chafed so long. So that the end of
the century sees her a power of the first rank, without a flaw
in her sovereignty, sharing with others the duty of policing
the Orient, and setting to others an example of rigid discipline,
conformity to law and military efficiency. And her education
in modem ways is so complete that she inclines to dismiss her
teachers and with the watchword "Japan for the Japanese"
march confidently on in her career.
China, on the contrary, has becomethepreyof the uropean
powers. One after another has taken advantage of her weak-
ness. Cessions and concessions have followed one another
thick and fast, until by comparison the United States appears
the most considerate of friends.
Into the present discords and their remedy it is not the
object of this article to inquire. It is confined to a simple con-
trast of the tendencies of the two countries as their relations
with our own exhibit them.
The difference of course lies in their different attitudes
toward modem ideas. Exactly as they have known how to
extract strength from them, so have they fared.
Power, military power, is still the principal test of inter-
national position. To secure fair treatment, a state must be
able to command it. The equality of states means the equality
of rights, not equality in getting those rights respected in the
world's practical politics. Japan can perform her own obliga-
tions, and is ready to maintain her rights. She is therefore on
an equality with others. China at present can do neither. Her
status is therefore inferior to others. This difference is the
necessary result of their different policies and ideas. If China
would occupy a better position she must throw away her pre-
judices and copy Japan. In that case two questions must be
asked.
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Under whose auspices shall China be introduced to civiliza-
tion? If persuaded thus to alter her policy, would not the in-
dustrial, perhaps the political, peace of theworldbe endangered?
In the answer to these questions lies the key to the history of
the coming century.
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